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T
he World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only
international body that regulates trade between
nations. A multilateral trading system that is
based on rules, its primary objective is to achieve
freer trade by ensuring that trade flows as smoothly and pre-
dictably as possible through the opening up of markets. WTO’s
top level decisionmaking body, the Ministerial Conference, had
its fifth meeting in Cancun, Mexico last September. After al-
most two years of stagnation in trade talks, the meeting was
held to take stock of progress in the negotiations and provide
other necessary work. Unfortunately, too much grandstanding,
excessive politicization, and less efforts to seek the necessary
compromises to reach a consensus led to the collapse of the
trade talks.
Issues of contention
There were three major controversial issues that divided devel-
oped and developing countries, namely: (a) removal of agricul-
tural subsidies, (b) tariff reduction on industrial goods, and (c)
the so-called “Singapore issues” which were heavily pushed by
Japan and the European Union (EU) and greatly opposed by
developing countries. The latter referred to investment policy,
competition policy, procedures for transparency in government
procurement, and trade-facilitating policies such as customs
procedures.
In both agriculture and industrial products, the main issue re-
volved on how to reduce trade barriers, how much the devel-
oped countries should give and how little developing countries
should give up. The United States (US) and the EU drew up a
framework to free agricultural trade but this was refused by the
G20+ countries. The G20+ is a new bloc of developing coun-
tries led by Brazil, China and India that coalesced before the
Cancun meeting to counter US and EU agricultural protection-
ism. They demanded rich countries to cut their subsidies and
free agricultural trade more and poor countries to offer much
less liberalization.
In 2001, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) countries spent US$311 billion to support
their agricultural sectors. The US, for one, provided US$3 bil-
lion subsidies to its farmers leading to a drop in the world price
of cotton and hurting more efficient African producers. Note
that developing countries’ agricultural sectors are also highly
protected, though not through subsidies which are unaffordable
to them but through very high tariffs.
While the overall tariffs on industrial goods applied by devel-
oped countries are already low, their tariffs remain high in la-
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bor-intensive products like textiles and other manufactures that
are of interest to developing countries. Rich countries are will-
ing to liberalize these sectors but they want the advanced de-
veloping countries to do the same. However, most developing
countries refuse to expose their industries to more international
competition. Countries like Brazil, which have huge agricultural
sectors, would not even discuss industrial goods until clear
gains in agriculture are seen. This hardening and seemingly
tough and uncompromising position complicated the whole
decisionmaking process in Cancun. With the participants tak-
ing too much time to reveal their true positions, the more it
became very difficult to achieve compromises.
On the Singapore issues, ministers could not agree on any of
the issues. Meanwhile, the developing countries rejected all
four issues outright on the ground that no concessions should
be made unless developed countries would concede to their
demands in agriculture. And while it is true that developing coun-
tries have limited knowledge and little negotiating capacity in
terms of investment and competition policy, there are, how-
ever, gains for both developed and developing countries from
reforms in terms of trade facilitation and government procure-
ment that would have addressed issues like transparency, cor-
ruption, and reduction of transaction costs of doing business
with governments. In the end, the EU was willing to forego com-
petition and investment issues but such move was deemed too
late because by then, tough stances were already adopted and
nobody wanted to yield.
Reactions/implications: the more telling issues
With the Cancun breakdown, anti-globalization groups and NGOs
were extremely delighted. The Philippines’ trade minister and
chief negotiator was also elated by it. However, it seems ironic
on how we could rejoice when the fact is that with the collapse
of the trade talks, every country would suffer, with some having
to suffer more than others. The developed countries have less
to lose since they have the resources and can always engage in
bilateral and regional agreements where they can easily flex
their economic muscles. The real losers are the developing
countries, especially the smaller and weaker ones.
Negotiators should go beyond the rhetoric that no deal is better
than a bad deal. An all or nothing position was taken to be a
political victory for G20+.
More specifically, like in the case of the Philippines, after Cancun,
there is a need to reflect on important issues like—have we
made up our minds on what we really want to achieve and what
our country’s interests are? Have we made cost-benefit assess-
ments of our negotiating positions on market access not only
for agriculture but also for industrial goods that are of interest
to us, notably textiles and clothing, footwear, leather and fish
products where developed countries’ tariffs are still high? Did
we assess the individual WTO issues and their ramifications on
the Philippine economy? Who in our economy would benefit and
who would lose and by how much? Did we forge correct alli-
ances or did we just follow herd mentality? Our negotiators should
not focus solely on the effect of freer trade on Filipino produc-
ers of like goods, but rather should focus on national economic
interest, i.e., the sum of all benefits to all Filipinos who gain
minus the costs to all Filipinos who lose.
While regionalism and bilateralism are fast becoming an ob-
session at the moment, a multilateral system based on rules is
still superior. There’s always the danger that regionalism might
give rise to substantial trade diversion while under bilateralism,
small countries have hardly any say and concessions can easily
be withdrawn. Thus, despite its weaknesses, the WTO still pro-
vides the best solution.
What’s ahead?
A Geneva meeting is scheduled in December 2003 to revive
the talks. To get back on track, much depends not only on pow-
erful countries like the US and the EU but on the cooperation of
weaker countries as well who need to recognize that they have
the most to lose if the talks collapse. Countries should commit
to more meaningful reforms. The US and the EU should go
beyond their earlier proposal on agriculture subsidies while ad-
vanced developing countries should pursue reforms to reduce
their own trade restrictions.
Uncertainty, however, currently still looms as the US 2004 elec-
tion and the EU enlargement threaten to dampen their interest
in trade talks.      
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